Introduction
Much research in theoretical cryptography has been centered around finding the weakest possible cryptographic assumptions required to implement major primitives. Ever since Diffie and Hellman first suggested that modern cryptography be based on one-way functions (which are easy to compute, but hard to invert) and trapdoor functions (one-way functions which are, however, easy to invert given an associated secret), researchers have been busy trying to construct schemes that only require one of these general assumptions. For example, pseudorandom generators at first could only be constructed from a specific hard problem, such as discrete log IBM2]. Later it was shown how to construct pseudo-random generators given any one-way permutation [Y] , and from other weak forms of one-way functions [Le, GKL] . Finally JILL] proved that the existence of any one-way function was a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of pseudo-random generators. Similarly, the existence of trapdoor permutations can be shown to be necessary and sufficient for secure encryption schemes.
However, progress on characterizing the requirements for secure digital signatures has been slower in coming. We will be interested in signature schemes which are secure agMnst existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attacks. This notion of security, as well as the first construction of digital signatures secure in this sense was provided by [GMR] . Their scheme was based on factoring, or more generally, the existence of clawfree pairs. More recently, signatures based on any trap-*supported in part by a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, DARPA contract N00014-80-C-0622, and Air Force Grant Permission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted provided that the copies are not made or distributed for direct commercial advantage, the ACM copyright notice and the title of the publication and its date appear, and notice is given that copying is by permission of the Association for Computing Machinery. To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee and/or specific permission.
door permutation [BM1] and any one-way permutation [NY] have been constructed. In this paper, we present a method for constructing secure digital signatures given any one-way function. This is the best possible result, since a one-way function can be constructed from any secure signature scheme.
Our method follows [NY] in basing signatures on oneway hash functions: functions which compress their input, but have the property that even given one preimage, it is hard to find a different one. This in itself provides a weak form of signature; they show how to build secure signatures from this primitive. To complete their construction, they provide a simple method for constructing a one-way hash function from any oneway permutation.
However, arbitrary one-way functions must be managed much more carefully. The bulk of this paper is concerned with building a one-way hash function given any one-way function. First we show how to build a function which has the property that given one preimage, although most other preimages may be trivial to find, a small fraction must be hard. Then we show how to amplify this into a full one-way hash function. Our proof makes heavy usage of universal hash functions [CW] .
• A probabilistic poly-time key generation algorithm KG, which on input 1 k, outputs a public key PK, and a matching secret key SK.
• A probabilistic poly-time signing algorithm SP, which given a message m and a matching pair of keys <PK,SK>, outputs a signature of m with respect to PK. * A poly-time verification algorithm V, which given S, m, and PK, tests whether or not S is a valid signature of m with respect to PK.
The notion of security we are interested in is security against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attack. This means we will allow our adversary, the forger, to adaptively choose messages, and be supplied with signatures. We will consider him successful if, on his own, he is able to produce a valid signature for any message that we did not sign for him. We will be interested in signature schemes for which no polynomialsized forger has a 1/p(k) chance of producing a forged message, for any polynomial p and for sufficiently large k. This is the strongest natural notion of security.
Lemma 1 The existence of a secure signature scheme implies the existence of a one-way function.
Proof: Let f(1 k, x) run the KG algorithm on input 1 k and using random tape x, and output PK. Then f is a one-way function. Why? Assume we could invert f. Then given the public key PK, we would be able to obtain a secret key SW with the property that SK' could generate signatures valid for PK. But this implies that the signature scheme is insecure, which is a contradiction. D
The [BM1] and [NY] signature schemes both use the notion of a window, due to Lamport [La] . In this limited signature scheme, the public file contains some one-way
To sign a bit function f and some ax,al,...,am,am. bi, the signer reveals f-l(a~'). The limitation is that only m bits can be signed. The scheme used by [BM1] is to have f be a trapdoor permutation, and at each stage sign a message and a new f. In this way, the same a's could be used over and over. The [NY] scheme modifies this slightly by, at each stage, signing the hash value of a new set of a's. They define a uniform family of one-way hash functions to to be such that no poly-time circuit exists which, first outputs an x, then, for a randomly selected function f from the family, can output a sibling of x--an x' ~ x such that f(x') = f (x) . Using this type of hash function, they are assured that signing the hash value of the a's is sufficient for security.
Their construction of a one-way hash function is as follows: Given f:~---*~" a one-way permutation, pick a random h : E ~ ~ E n-1 from a 2-universal family of hash functions. Their one-way hash function is h o f. 
Universal Hash Functions
Note that, since Z is a degree 2k polynomial in the Xi's, E[Z] has the same value in any distribution with at least 2k-wise independence. In particular, assuming full independence of the Xi's and using that k = o(pN), we can compute a bound of (2kpN) k on E [Z] . The lemma follows from plugging in this bound for E [Z] . {3
Finally, we give the standard construction of a kuniversal family of hash functions from m-bit strings to m-bit strings. Let F = GF(2m). For a0,...,ak-1 E F, we let
hao ..... ak_,(x) = ao + alx +... + ak_lx k-1
The fact that this is a k-universal hash function follows from a simple interpolation argument. Finally note that the case m < I can be handled by padding out the argument to the hash function; the case m > l can be handled by stripping bits from the result of the hash function.
Notation
Function f : E k -~ Era is one-way in the non-uniform (uniform) model if f is poly-time computable, but there is not poly-sized family of circuits A (probabilistic polytime algorithm A) such that
for infinitely many k, where the probability is as x is chosen uniformly from E k. In this paper, we will use the non-uniform model of security unless stated otherwise.
For a function f, we define the following:
We will denote the concatenation of strings x and y by x • y. We will denote the composition of functions f
3
Constructing a One-way Hash
Function
.
Overview
[n this section we will show how to, given any one¢¢ay function, create a family of one-way hash functions. this will imply that we can construct, given any one-'~ay function, a signature scheme secure against exis-~;ential forgery under adaptive chosen message attacks. Starting with our original one-way function f, we con-,~truct a series of functions, each one closer to our goal of ~ one-way hash function. In Section 3.2, we construct 7~ function fl with the property that, although most :-;ihlings under fl may be easy to find, a non-negligible fraction are provably hard to find. Next, in Section 3.3, ,re construct a function f2 such that most siblings under f2 are provably hard to find. Then, in Section 3.4, we construct a function f3 with the property that almost all the time, it is hard to find any sibling. This func-~.ion is length-increasing, so in Section 3.5 we construct from it a function f4 which is sibling-hard and lengthdecreasing. Finally, in Section 3.6, we give a family of ,me-way hash functions.
3.2
Making Some Siblings Hard 'Fhe big cryptographic property of a one-way hash funclion is that it is hard to find a sibling of any domain (dement. Naor and Yung start with a one-way permul ation, which trivially has this property, and thus only had to show how to make the function compress as well.
We are not so fortunate. Consider, for example, the function f(< x, y >) =< g(x), 1 k >, where x and y are k-bit strings, and g is some one-way permutation. It it easy to show that f is one-way, but that each element of the domain has an exponential number of siblings, all of which are trivial to find. Nevertheless, in this section, we will show how to take any one-way function and convert it into one for which we can prove that at least some (a non-negligible fraction) of the siblings are hard to find. We begin by putting our one-way function into a normal form. Assume we are given a function f : E m --~ E ra which is one way. Let l(m) = [log m] and k(m) = 2 z(ra). Let n = m+4k(m)+l(m)+2. We construct the function /to : E n --~ En such that for x E Era, y E E 4k(ra), and
where the A is bitwise AND. The reason for constructing f0 is that its preimage structure is largely known. 
IDj(.fo)l
From this form, one can easily observe the monotone nature of IDj(fo)l for small and large j. For m < j < 4k(m), we note that
Now we can construct a function fl such that a nonnegligible fraction of the siblings are hard to find. Let hi be randomly chosen from an n-universal family of hash functions mapping (n/2+log n)-bit strings to n-bit strings. Let h2 be randomly chosen from an n-universal family of hash functions mapping n-bit strings to (n/2-21ogn)-bit strings. Then we let fl = h~ o f0 o hi (fl maps E n[2Wl°gn to En/2-21°g').
Next we must define what we mean by a hard sibling.
For any hi, h2, and for any x E E n/2-21°gn, we define the hard sibling set Hhx,hz(X) to be the set of y's in E'*/2-21og,, such that
fi(y) = fl(x)

fo(hl(y)) # fo(hl(x))
hi(y) E D,,/2(fo).
The first condition states that y is a sibling of z. We will not be able to prove any hardness results about elements which collide with x on hi or f0, so we will simply declare them to be easy siblings. The second condition states that y is a sibling of x due to a collision on h2, not on f0 (or hi). Finally, we give for technical reasons which will be apparent below the third condition on a sibling being hard. For convenience, wg also define the set of easy siblings, Eht,h~(X ) = St, (X)-Hh,,h2(X).
Now we can give two lemmas which make precise the hardness of fl. The first is that hard siblings are actually hard. Hhl, h2(X) is at least n -~, then there is a poly-sized family of circuits which invert fo with non-negligible probability.
Proof: Let n = m+4k(m)+l(m)+2 and x E y]n/2+logn
be such that A~ outputs a hard sibling of x with probability at least n -e. We will show that there is a circuit B such that Pr[fo(B(fo(w) )) = f0(w)] >_ n -`-2 where the probability is taken over w picked uniformly from E'*. Algorithm B, given z = fo(w), picks hi at random, picks r E E n/2-21°gn at random, then picks h2 at random subject to the constraint that h2(fo(hl(x))) = h2(z) = r. It then lets y be the output of An given hi, h2, and x. Finally, if fo(ht(y)) = z, it outputs hi(y), otherwise it outputs "failure."
We will, in fact, only try to invert strings in R,~/2(fo).
So, for now, let us assume that w is picked uniformly from D,~/2(fo). Under this assumption, let us first consider the probability that A, outputs an element of 
Hh~,h=(X).
hi,h2
The above summation would be at least n -~ if the probability that B selected hi and h2 was exactly equal to the probability of picking hi and h2 uniformly at random. What we will in fact show is that, for almost all hi and h2, these two probabilities differ by at most a (1 + 2 -'~/s) factor. This implies that the summation above is at least n-C(1 -2-~/8).
Fix any hi and r. Let G(h2) contain the elements of D,~/2(fo) which h2 o f0 map to r, i.e.
G(h2) = fol(h21(r)) f) Dn/2(fo).
The expected size of G(h~) is n22'~/2/4k(m).
Using a slight variant of Lemma 2 we can show that for all but an exponentially vanishing fraction of the h2's, n22n/2 n22n/2 (1 --2 -"/s) < IG(h2)l < 4k--~(1 + 2-n/s).
4k(m)
This holds even if we first restrict to those h2 which map fo(hl(X)) to r. Since for every w, the fraction of the h2's for which h2(fo(w)) = h2(f0(hl(x))) = r is exactly 2 -'~-4 logn, we can think of B as uniformly picking a pair < w, h2 > from the set {< w, h2 > Ih2(fo(w)) = h2(fo(hx(z))) = r). So clearly, the probability of picking h2 is exactly proportional to the size of IG(h2)l, and is thus within a (1 +2 -"/8) factor of uniform for almost all h2. Now let us assume that A,~ does in fact output a hard sibling y. Then in particular, hi
(y) E G(h2)-S]o(hl(X)).
But given the information g,, sees (i.e.
hi, h2, r, and x), w is just a random element of
G(h~) -Sfo(h~(x)). So
Pr[fo(hl(y)) = fo(w) = z]
So if w is picked uniformly from D~/2(fo ) then the probability B outputs "failure" is at most 1-1/n. Since Dn/2(fo) accounts for more than a 1/n fraction of E '*, this implies that the probability the B outputs failure is at most 1 -1/n 2. [] Lemma 4 says that we cannot find hard siblings in polynomial time. The next lemma says that these hard siblings form a non-negligible fraction of the possible siblings.
Lemma 5 Fix x E En/2+logn and let X be a random variable (dependent on the random choice of hi and h2) such that
X = log IS t,(~)l i.
e. X is the logarithm of the ratio between the number of siblings and the number of easy siblings. Then the X takes on values in the range 0 to n and has ezpected value at least ~(1/n).
Proof: Consider some w E y]n/2+|ogn, We will show that with constant probability, w has at most n 3 siblings, and at least n 2 of them are hard. Pick x E E'~ and z E E '*/2-21°g'~ at random, and let y = f0(x). We will restrict our attention to hash functions hi which map wtox and h2 which map y to z. Note that pickingx at random and then hi at random subject to hi(w) = x is the same as just picking hi at random, and we are similarly picking h~ at random.
Consider any sibling w' and let x' = hx(w') and y ' = fo(x~) . To show that the number of siblings is small, we consider 4 cases: First we count the number ofw' such that x' E Ui<_n/2Di(fo). Using standard hash function arguments, we can show that with overwhelming probability, the number of such x' mapped to z is 2n22n/2 at most ~ , and thus with overwhelming probability, the number of w ~ mapped to such x ~ is at most 3n3/4. The second case is x j E Di(fo) for some i in 3 the range n/2 < i< n/2+-~logn. For each suchi, a similar argument shows that, with overwhelming probability, there are at most n 11/4 to t mapped to such x'. The third case is x' E Di(fo) for some i > n/2 + ~ log n.
In this case, with probability at least 1 -1/V/'ff, there are no such w' at all mapping to z, other than ones for which y' = y. Finally, we consider the case when y' = y. With probability at least 3/8, Ifo~(y)l < 2 ~12, in which case it is very unlikely that more than n such w ~ exist. Putting this all together, with probability at least 1/3, the number of siblings is at most 4n3/5. Now consider the number of hard siblings. With overwhelming probability, at least 1.1n2 'q2 elements of Dn/2(fo) -Slo(y) map to z, and thus with overwhelming probability, at least n 2 siblings of w map through Dn/2(fo) -Slo(y ). These are exactly the hard siblings Df W. Therefore, with probability at least 1/3, X is at least
More details of the hash function arguments in the ~bove lemmas will appear in the full version of this paper.
Making Most Siblings Hard
:n the previous section, we showed how to, given any one-way function, construct one for which some of the Ablings are hard to find. In this section we will construct a function for which almost all siblings are hard I,o find. Again, we must show two facts, first that our notion of hardness is correct, and second that most siblings are in fact hard.
Lemma 6 If there exists a poly-sized family of circuits A such that for an infinite number of n, there exists an x of length n6 + 2n s log n, such that the probability over hi and h2 that A outputs an element of Hg~,~(x) is at least n -r, then there is a poly-sized family of circuits which invert fo with non-negligible probability.
Proof: Given an algorithm for finding a hard sibling under f~, we obtain an algorithm for finding a hard sibling of fl as follows. If x = xl -...-x2,~s, we will select an i at random between 1 and 2n 5 and attempt to find a hard sibling for zi. Given hi and h~ picked at random, we pick the rest of h~ and h 2 at random, run A to get y = Yl "...'Y2ns. If y is a hard sibling of x under f2, then some yj must be a hard sibling of xj under ]'1. Since i was chosen at random, there is a 1/2n 5 chance that i = j. Thus with probability at least 1/2n c+5, we output a hard sibling for xi. By Lemma 4, this implies the existence of an inversion algorithm for f0. [] Lemma 7 Fix x E E n6+2n~l°gn and let X be a random variable (dependent on the random choice of l~ and 1 ['2) such that
Then the probability the X < O(n 4) is at most e -®(n). In other words, with all but an exponentially small probability, there is an exponential gap between the number' of siblings and the number of easy siblings.
Proof: Because both easy siblings and all siblings of ./2 are just cross products of the respective sets from fl, we get that X is the sum of X1,...,X~,~, chosen independently according to the distribution defined in Lemma 5. But by Lemma 5, each Xi is between 0 and n and has expected value at least 1/3n. The lemma follows from applying Chernoff's bounds. []
Making All Siblings Hard
From the previous section, we now have a function where almost all the siblings are hard to find. Unfortunately, there still may be an exponential number of easy siblings for any element of the domain. In this section, we show how to use the exponential gap between easy and hard siblings to construct a function where, except with an exponentially small probability, all siblings are hard. Let us look more carefully at Lernma 7. We rewrite the random variable X as Y-Z, where random variable Y = log lS/2(x) [ and random variable Z : log lEh-l,h-(x)l. Assume for now that we are told the values of E [Y] and E[Z] (we will remove this assumption in Section 3.6). Let l = (E[Y] + E[Z])/2. Then let h3 be randomly chosen from an 2-universal family of hash functions mapping (n 6 + 2n 5 log n -/)-bit strings to (n 6 + 2n 5log n)-bit strings. Let fa(x) = f2 (ha(x) ).
The intuition is that ha selects a very small subset of the domain of f2. This subspace is so small that it will not contain any easy siblings, although it will contain many hard siblings. This intuition is captured more formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 8 Fix x E E n~+2ns logn-l. Then with probability at least 1 -e -®(n) (over the choice of the hash functions), ha(S/3(x ) -{x}) C ti2(x) .
Proof: Z is the sum of Z1,...,Z2nb, where each Zi is the logarithm of the number of easy siblings of xi and is between 0 and n. Then, by Chernoff bounds,
In particular, plugging in a = (1-E[Z] )/2 > n4/6, we get that the probability Z > (E[Z] + 1)/2 is at most e -'/144. Assuming that Z < (E[Z] + 1)/2, The probability that h~l (EK, , ~2(x) ) ~ x is at most [E~,,~(x) Given Lemma 8, it is trivial to show that any algorithm that outputs a sibling for f3 some polynomial fraction of the time can be converted into one which outputs a sibling for f2 with virtually the same probability (which in turn implies the existence of an inverter for f0)-
Compressing
We have finally achieved a function with the hardsibling property that we want. However, there are still a couple of problems left to be solved. The most obvious is that, in our quest to get the hard-sibling property, we have created a length-increasing function. In particular, the function ]'3 constructed in the previous section maps (n 6 + 2n 5 logn -/)-bit strings to (n 6 -4n 5 logn)-bit strings. Since one can show that l = O(n6), it is clear that f3 expands its input, and by quite a bit. In fact, simply applying a randomly selected hash function h4 mapping (n 6 -4n 5 log n)-bit strings to (n 6 + 2n ~ log n -l -n/50)-bit strings to the result of f3 will solve the problem. So let f4(x) be h4 (f3(x) ). Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 9 Fix x E ~ n~q-2nsl°gn-l. Then with probability at least 1 -e -e(n), h4 induces no collisions with x,
i.e. SS,(x ) = Sf3(x ).
Proof: We will bound the size of the range of f3 by 2 n~+2nbl°gn-l-n[40. Once we have established this fact, the lemma follows trivially. In principle, we would like to bound the range of f3 by
In fact, it will be more convenient to work with f2. We will consider 2 cases. 
The second case we consider is z E Ui<l Ri(f2). Here, we will bound the number of such z in the range of f3 by the number of x in the domain of f3 which map to them. To do this, we first note that I UID'(L2)I < -(Elvl-'?/4""
Now we can apply Lemma 2 to bound the number of x in the domain of ]'3 which map to z E Ui<l/g/(f2) by 2 '~/6+2'?-I-n/4°-1 for almost all hz.
Adding these two parts together, we get the desired bound on the range of f3 for almost all hash functions, so h4 is very unlikely to induce a collision. [] As an immediate corollary, we can show that any sibling finder for f4 is a sibling finder for f3.
3.6
Putting Things Together
Now that we have achieved some compression, we can run this scheme in parallel and series to achieve arbitrary amounts of compression. More specifically, we achieve a compression of at least a (1 -1/50n 5) factor at each stage, so if we start out with O(n s) copies in parallel, we can in O(n 5log n) stages compress by a factor of O(n3). This is important, because there is still one last problem to remove. When constructing f3, we assumed we knew the correct value of l. In fact, we know little about it. However, we need only know its value to within an additive O(n4). So we can build a new function f5 which hashes its input using ®(n 2) different values for l and outputting all the hash values. By the above, we know that f5 compresses by a factor of n. Since any sibling under f5 is a sibling under each component hash function, a sibling finder for f5 is automatically a sibling finder for whichever of the components has a good value for I. Thus f5 is a oneway hash function. Summing up we get the following Lheorems. Finally, we note that, although this paper has been mostly phrased in terms of the non-uniform model of security, our construction works equally well in the uniform model. Thus we get the following theorem. 
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